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of disagreement with the unanimous account of all other 
witnesses in the vicinity who testified was his claim that the 
deceased fired first. [18] Of course, it was for the jury 
to determine his credibility as against that of said witnesses 
who agreed that only one shot was fired. (People v. Smith, 
15 Ca1.2d 640, 648 [104 P.2d 510].) There was substantial 
evidence in support of the jury's determination and its find-
ing will not be disturbed. (People v. Smith, snpra, p. 648; 
People v. Eggers, 30 Cal.2d 676, 685 [185 P.2d 1].) 
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are 
affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Tray-
nor, ,J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
15, 1953. 
[L. A. No. 22369. In Bank. Dec. 19, 1952.] 
GEORGE T. FRANCK et al., Respondents, v. THE J. J. 
SUGARMAN-RUDOLPH COMPANY (a Partnership) 
et al., Defendants; J. J. SUGARMAN et al., Appellants. 
[1] Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Uniform Sales Act.-The 
Uniform Sales Act does not apply to sales of corporate 
stock. (Civ. Code, § 1796.) 
[2] Sales- Warranties- Waiver- Acceptance and RetentLon of 
Goods.-Purpose of Civ. Code, § 1769, stating that in absence 
of agreement the acceptance of goods does not discharge 
seller for breach of promise or warranty, but requiring notice 
by buyer of claimed breach in reasonable time to preserve 
his rights, was to ameliorate harshness of common law rule 
in some states that mere acceptance by or passage of title 
to buyer of goods constituted a waiver of any and all reme-
dies for breach of warranty, and at the same time to give 
seller some protection against stale claims by requiring notice. 
[1] Uniform Sales Act as applicable to sale of corporate stock, 
note, 99 A.L.R. 275. See, also, Am.Jur., Sales, § 3. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Sales, § 60. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Corporations, § 305; [2] Sales, 
§ 141; [3, 4] Corporations, § 307; [6, 7] Corporations, § 322. 
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[3] Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Warranties-Waiver.-
General rules on sales of goods, in effect prior to adoption 
of Uniform Sales Act, apply to sales of corporate stock, in-
cluding rule that an acceptance of goods by the buyer, know-
ing of breach of warranty, constituted a waiver by him of 
a claim for damages for the breach, at least unless he gave 
notice of his complaint within a reasonable time. 
[ 4] !d.-Transfers of Stock-Warranties-Waiver.-Conclusion 
of trial court that buyer waived alleged breach of written 
contract of sale of all stock of corporation by failing to in-
form sellers of alleged deficiency in assets of corporation 
until at least three years after completion of audit of cor-
poration's books, notwithstanding repeated requests for such 
information, was correct although the court did not specifically 
mention Civ. Code,§ 1769, requiring notice by buyer of claimed 
breach within a reasonable time to preserve his rights, and 
although that section may not be technically controlling, 
where the parties agreed that the buyer's auditors should 
make their report within a reasonable time, and where the 
rule followed by the court, whether based on the law of sales 
of personal property apart from the Uniform Sales Act or 
on that statute itself, is substantially the same. 
[5] !d.-Transfers of Stock-Cross-demands-Waiver.-Merely 
because the amount of payment for all stock of corpora-
tion was by agreement of the parties to be reduced by off-
sets arising out of a deficiency of assets of the corporation, 
does not necessarily mean that a notice of the asserted de-
ficiency should not be given in a reasonable time after dis-
covery, and the right to have an offset for such defieiency 
is waived by failure to give notice of the deficiency within 
a reasonable time. 
[6] !d.-Transfers of Stock-Actions-Limitations.-An action 
based on contracts for sale of all stock of corporation is 
not barred by the statute of limitations, whether it be as-
sumed that the two-year period applies, as for money had 
and received (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, sub d. 1), or the four-
year period, as an action for breach of contract (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 337, subd. 1), where the action was commenced less 
than a year after the federal government, to which a por-
tion of the purchase price had been paid to discharge a tax 
lien against the corporation, refunded the taxes, and where 
the balance of the purchase price was not to be paid to 
plaintiffs until the refund was obtained and hence the action 
did not accrue at least until then. 
[7] !d.-Transfers of Stock-Actions-Parties.-An action based 
on contracts for sale of all stock of corporation may be 
maintained by sellers notwithstanding the fact that a tax re-
fund by the federal government, to which a portion of the 
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purchase price had been paid to discharge a tax lien against 
the corporation, was received by the corporation, which was 
removed as a party to the action, rather than defendant 
buyer, where, regardless of whether the action was for money 
had and receiveq or on the contracts, the tax refund received 
by the corporation was for the use and benefit of plaintiffs 
under agreements providing that if the refund was received 
by the corporation, defendant would cause the corporation 
to assign it to plaintiffs. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Henry M. Willis, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for money had and received. Judgment for plain-
ttffs affirmed. 
Knight, Gitelson, Ashton & Habenbaugh, Alfred Gitelson 
and Leon Savitch for Appellants. 
John W. Preston and John W. Preston, Jr., for Re-
spondents. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiffs commenced an action for money 
had and received in the sum of over $65,000. Defendants, 
a partnership hereafter referred to as defendant, and the 
partners, answered raising general issues and also counter-
claimed and asserted affirmative defenses for over $98,000, 
and raised the defense of the statute of limitations (Code Civ. 
Proc., §§339[1], 337[1], 338[4], 343). 
'fhe judgment from which defendant appeals awarded 
plaintiffs $64,054.61, with interest, and that defendant take 
uothing by the counterclaim. The court excluded evidence 
on the affirmative defenses and counterclaim on the ground 
that defendant had waived them. 
According to the findings, on August 7, 1943, plaintiffs en-
tered into a written agreement with defendant, agreeing to 
sell all of the issued shares (3,267) of Hercules Foundries, 
Inc., a eorporation, (hereafter called Hercules) for $110,000. 
The contract provided that plaintiffs "represent and guar-
antee'' that the financial condition and property of Hercules 
was (as of July 31, 1943) as set forth in the contract, and 
in reliance on that "guarantee" defendant promised to buy 
the stoek and to pay for it as follows: $10,000 on execution 
of the contract, $90,000 on delivery of the stock and the 
balance of $10,000 when they received (paragraph 2 [ c]) "a 
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certificate signed jointly by" plaintiffs' auditor and de-
fendant's auditor "verifying the truth of the representations" 
and guarantees above mentioned. 
Plaintiffs delivered to defendant the stock and all the assets 
and records of Hercules on August 16, 1943. On August 
18, 1943, the United States Collector of Internal Revenue 
filed a lien for taxes against Hercules for $103,112.67. To 
meet that situation and pay the taxes under protest the 
parties entered into a new contract on August 21, 1943, 
modifying the first one to the effect that from the money pay-
able by defendant to plaintiffs for the stock there would be 
paid under protest sufficient to discharge the tax lien; and 
that defendant would cause Hercules to prosecute a claim 
for refund of the $103,112.67 for the use of plaintiffs. Men-
tion vvas again made of the guarantee and audit and it was 
provided that if the tax refund is received, defendant will 
cause Hercules to assign to plaintiffs all right to the refund 
subject to such existing offsets, if any, arising out of the 
''guarantee.'' Pursuant to the agreements, escrows were pro-
vided and other supplemental agreements were made which 
are discussed later herein. 
ln accordance with the last contract the tax lien was paid 
and a refund claim made, resulting in refunds in August 
and December, 1948, amounting to $82.54-6.45. 
In compliance with paragraph 2(c) of the first contract 
(above rnentioned) shortly after the delivery of the stock, etc., 
defendant had its auditors make an audit of Hercules' books. 
'l'he auditors submitted to defendant a preliminary report in 
the latter part of September, 1943, and a final report in Sep-
tember, 1944, and at all times thereafter defendant had actual 
knowledge of all matters pertaining to the property, assets 
and financial condition of Hercules as of July 31, August 7 
and August 21, 1943. 'l'he audit showed according to de-
fendant's counterclaim and affirmative defenses, that the value 
of Hercules' assets was $98,448.74, less than represented by 
the guarantee and balance sheet in the first agreement. Plain-
tiffs had no such knowledge and did not know that defendant 
elaimed or asserted the assets were less than represented in 
the first agreement or that a violation of that contract had 
occurred until they were notified by and received from de-
fendant a copy of the audit on July 31, 1947. Defendant ac-
cepted the stocks, assets and records of Hercules and at all 
times has retained exclusive possession thereof. Finding 
that an unreasonable time elapsed between the audit and 
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notification to plaintiffs, the court concluded defendant had 
waived the purported breach of promise as to the assets of 
Hercules upon which its affirmative defenses and counter-
claim are based and the claim of breach was barred by laches 
and section 1769 of the Civil Code. 
Finally, the court concluded that defendant held for and 
was indebted to plaintiffs in the sum of $64,054.61, which 
was the amount of the tax refund recovered less expense of 
recovery. 
In addition to defendant's having obtained and retained 
at all times after August 16, 1943, and after they knew the 
claimed breach of the "guarantee," all the stock and assets 
of Hercules, it appears from the record that after the con-
tracts were made, correspondence passed between Mr. Gazlay, 
a representative who was handling the matter for plain-
tiffs, and Mr. Katz, the representative of defendant. On 
September 13, 1943, Gazlay wrote to Katz stating that de-
fendant's auditors had said the audit was practically com-
pleted; that it should be completed as soon as possible and 
that plaintiffs should receive a statement from defendant as 
to whether it claimed the assets and financial condition of 
Hercules was not as represented in the contract; that the 
time to settle the matter was "now when the facts are 
fresh and records available.'' Katz replied on September 
14, 1943, agreeing with the thoughts expressed by Gazlay 
and stating that he had asked the auditors for a report and 
would advise Gazlay as soon as he had it. On September 
30, 1943, Gazlay wrote to Katz calling his attention to the 
previous correspondence and again requesting the report. 
On October 4, 1943, Katz sent to Gazlay a copy of a letter 
from defendant's auditors which was in response to a letter 
from Katz to the auditors. The auditors stated they expected 
to have a final report ready on October 11, 1943, a draft of 
which had been made. On October 11, 1943, Gazlay wrote 
to Katz. He referred to the copy of the auditors' letter 
and stated that under the contract the report should be 
finished in a reasonable time and such time had elapsed 
and the matter should be settled now while the facts were 
fresh in the parties' minds. Receiving no reply from Katz, 
Gazlay wrote to Katz on November 2, 1943, demanding the 
report and stating that the failure to furnish it was a breach 
of the contracts. Again receiving no reply Gazlay wrote 
on January 6, 1944. He referred to the former correspondence 
and of Katz' refusal to speak to him on the telephone and 
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stated: ''. . . it would appear that I am entitled to at least 
professional courtesy. If your clients do not desire to give 
the statement, you could at least have written an evasive 
letter, at which I am advised you excell. I resent the treat-
ment received from you. I again request a copy of the 
statement hereinbefore referred to.'' In a letter from Katz 
to the auditors on September 14, 1943, Katz stated he agreed 
with Gazlay that then was the time to determine whether 
the balance sheet in the contracts was correct. Gazlay died 
in 1944 and several of plaintiffs' predecessors in interest 
died. As before seen from the findings, defendant had a pre-
liminary report in the latter part of September, 1943, and 
the final in September, 1944, but did not give a copy to 
plaintiffs or advise that they made any claim of a breach 
of the "guarantee" until July 31, 1947. 
As seen from the findings it was the theory of the trial 
court that defendant lost its claim for damages for the 
alleged breach of the guarantee because of the unreasonable 
length of time elapsing after their discovery of the claimed 
deficiency of Hercules' assets (at least three years) and by 
reason of the conduct of defendants during that time. As 
we construe the findings they may be based on either laches, 
waiver, or a failure to comply with section 1769 of the 
Civil Code.* 
Defendant's main contention is that it did not lose its 
rights under any of those theories; that section 1769 cannot 
apply because it is a part of the Uniform Sales Act as 
adopted in this state and does not include sales of stocks 
in a corporation; that, as the action is legal in nature the 
equitable doctrine of laches cannot apply; that there was no 
assent to the alleged breach of the guarantee; and that there 
could be no bar by laches, waiver or otherwise because the 
contracts contemplated and the law is that any claimed de-
ficiency in the assets would be offset against the purchase 
price; that in effect the purchase price was not to be paid 
until the correctness of the ''guarantee'' and the amount 
of recovery for refund of taxes had been ascertained. 
*Civil Code, § 1769: "In the absence of expTess or implied agree-
ment of the parties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall not 
discharge the seller from liability in damages or other legal remedy 
for breach of any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or the 
sale. But, if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give 
notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within 
a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such 
breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor.'' 
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Section 1796 of our Civil Code reads the same as, 
and is a part of, the Uniform Sales Act, adopted in this 
state. The act, with the exception of the statute of frauds 
provision ( Civ. Code, § 1724), refers to the sales of goods 
and that term is defined to ''include all chattels personal 
other than things in action and money. The term includes 
industrial growing crops, and things attached 
to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be 
severed before sale or under the contract of sale.'' ( Civ. 
§ 1796.) And, by reason thereof, it has been held 
inapplicable to the sale of corporate shares. (Porter v. Gib-
son, 25 Cal.2d 506 [154 P.2d 703]; Eckart v. Brown, 34 Cal. 
App.2d 182 [93 P.2d 212]; Williston on Sales (rev.ed.), 
§ 619 [a].) It was also stated in the Porter case that the 
court would not apply the sales act to sales of stock by analogy 
and for sake of uniformity as was done in Agar v. Orda, 
264 N.Y. 248 [190 N.E. 479]. It may be noted that this 
state has also adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act 
Code, §§ 2450 et seq.) but no provision thereof has 
been indicated as supplying a solution to the instant case. 
That being the case it is of no assistance in determining what 
rule should be applied here. The court went on in the Por-
tt>r case, however, and applied the law of sales of personal 
property (other than as stated in the sales act), particularly 
as enunciated in Cttthal v. Peabody, 19 Cal.App. 304 [125 P. 
926], which, in dealing with sales of stock, relied upon the 
provisions of the Civil Code and rules of law in cases deal-
ing with the sales of personal property as they existed be-
fore the Uniform Sales Act was adopted. 
The first sentence of section 1769 of the Civil Code, 
supra, states that in the absence of agreement the acceptance 
of the goods does not discharge the seller for breach of promise 
or warranty, but the second sentence requires notice by the 
buyer of a claimed breach in a reasonable time to preserve 
his rights. 'l'he purpose of the two sentences was to "amelio-
rate the harshness of the common law rule in some states that 
the mere acceptance by or passage of title to the buyer of the 
goods constituted a waiver of any and all remedies for breach 
of warranty, and at the same time to give the seller some pro-
tection against stale claims by requiring notice. (See discus-
sion, Williston on Contracts [rev.ed.], § 714.)" (Whitfield 
v. Jessup, 31 Cal.2d 826, 828 [193 P.2d 1].) [3] Apparently 
the rule was, before the uniform act, as to the sale of personal 
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property generally that an acceptance of the goods by the 
buyer, knowing of the breach of warranty, constituted a 
waiver by him of a claim for damages for the breach, at least 
unless he gave notice of his complaint within a reasonable 
time. (See Strefl v. Gold 111edal Creamery Co., 96 Cal.App. 18 
[273 P. 831]; Glaclium Co., Inc. v. Thatcher, 95 Cal.App. 85 
[272 P. 340]; Stockton Lb1·. Co. v. Mulcahy, 86 Cal.App. 505 
[260 P. 897] ; Ame1·ican Steel Pipe etc. Co. v. Hubbard, 42 
Cal.App. 520 [183 P. 8:30] ; Burrell v. Southern Calif. C. Co., 
;;5 Cal.App. 162 [169 P. 405] ; Doak Gas Engine Co. v. Fraser, 
168 Cal. 624 [143 P. 1024]; Byron Jackson JJiachine Works 
v. Dufl, 158 Cal. 47 [109 P. 616]; Pigott v. Clar·k, 133 Cal. 
App. 53 [23 P.2d 800] ; 22 Cal.Jur. 983-988.) The same rule 
is stated in the Restatement. (Rest., Contracts, § 412.) And 
it has been held either tacitly or directly that the general 
rules on sales of goods applied to sales of corporate stock. 
(See Cuthill v. Peabody, s~r,pm, 19 Cal.App. 304; Kirkland v. 
Levin, 63 Cal.App. 589 [219 P. 455] ; Po?'ter v. Gibson, supra, 
25 Cal.2d 506.) 
[4] There appears to be no valid reason why the rule 
applicable to the question here involved and stated in the sales 
act and probably the law before the sales act, should not 
apply to sales of stock in a corporation, especially when it is 
remembered that the sale included all of the stock, and in 
effect, all of the records and assets, tangible and intangible, 
of the corporation. Although defendant did not know of the 
financial condition of Hercules when the stock was transferred, 
it found out later and for over three years made no claim of 
the breach of the guarantee, and in the meantime some of the 
parties concerned with the transaction died. From the corres-
pondence between Gazley and Katz, the latter, as above seen, 
agreed that defendant's auditors should make their report 
within a reasonable time and it should be ascertained whether 
there was any claim of a breach of the guarantee by plaintiffs 
while the facts were fresh in the minds of the parties. The 
reason, to protect the seller from stale claims (Whitfield v. 
J essnp, sttpra, 31 Cal.2d 826) is present. Hence, we con-
clude that the trial court was correct in its conclusion, 
althou§rh it did specifically mention section 1769 of the Civil 
Code as one of the grounds for its ruling, and that section 
may not be technically controlling. It is true that there are 
indications in the record that the court was basing its con-
clusion on section 1769, but as we have seen, the findings are 
broad enough to include waiver, and it makes no difference 
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whether that was based upon the law of sales of personal 
property apart from the sales act or the sales act itself, as 
the rule is substantially the same. 
Defendant argues, however, that even assuming section 
1769 to be applicable, there are other supplemental agree-
ments as well as the ag-reements of August 7 and 21, 1943, 
which show that any deficiency in the assets as compared with 
the "guarantee" waR to be ascertained when the tax refund 
was obtained (it was received in 1948, one year after de-
fendant g·ave notice to plaintiffs of the claimed breach of 
"guarantee") and then any offsets by reason of the deficiency 
were to be made against the refund. Escrow instructions 
were entered into pursuant to the August 7th contract where-
by $90,000 was to be deposited with a bank by defendant 
and paid out by the bank when it received a certificate signed 
by the auditors of the parties as prescribed by paragraph 2 (c) 
of the August 7th contract, and if the certificate shows a 
deficiency in the assets the latter should be deducted and the 
balance paid to plaintiffs. On August 19, 1943, after the tax 
lien was filed the parties in an agreement referred to the tax 
lien and the $90,000 which was deposited with the bank and 
provided that that sum plus $15,000 (including the $10,000 
down payment) be deposited with the federal court ·wherein 
the tax refund action was pending and the balance (after a 
certain deduction) shall be applied to pay defendant the 
amount of any deficiency under the guarantee as determined 
by the auditors of the parties. Then followed the contract 
of August 21, 1943, heretofore mentioned, in which it was 
provided that the balance of the purchase price (after men-
tioning the method for payment of a small portion of it) 
shall be payable out of the tax refund when received, sub-
ject as above mentioned to the offsets, if any, by reason of any 
deficiency in the assets which shall be deducted from the 
refund. 
Implicit in the court's finding that an unreasonable time 
had elapsed after defendant discovered the asserted de-
ficiency, is the conclusion that the audit and claim of deficiency 
must be made in a reasonable time after the contracts were 
made, and the correspondenee heretofore discussed shows that 
Katz, defendant's representative, so construed the agreements. 
It also shows that the parties considered that the audit should 
(at least initially) be made by defendant's auditors, which, of 
course, is reasonable because the audit was primarily for de-
fendant's benefit, inasmuch as it was the party who would be 
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benefited if there was a deficiency in the assets. Defendant 
had the possession and control of the records and assets of 
Hercules. Plaintiffs had no real opportunity to have their 
auditors make an audit as Katz kept stalling on the report 
of defendant's auditors, never even mentioning an audit 
by plaintiffs' auditors. While the agreements speak of 
payment in terms of offsets, the trial court was justified in 
finding impliedly at least (it found waiver and that an un-
reasonable time had elapsed) that defendant should give a 
reasonable time notice of any claimed deficiency disclosed by 
the audit after it discovered the same. [5] Merely because 
the amount of payment for the stock was to be reduced by off-
sets arising out of a deficiency, does not necessarily mean that 
a notice of the asserted deficiency should not be given in a 
reasonable time after discovery, that is, that the rule of law 
above held applicable to this case does not apply. 
In this same connection defendant cites Jones v. Morti-
mer, 28 Cal.2d 627 [170 P.2d 893], where we held that 
under certain circumstances cross-demands between parties 
under section 440 of the Code of Civil Procedure will be 
deemed compensated and thus paid to the extent they equal 
each other and hence the statute of limitation does not run on 
the paid portion. That has no application iu the instant case 
where the rule of law declared is applied, because here the 
right to have damages or offset for the alleged breach of the 
''guarantee'' is waived for failure to give notice of the claim 
of breach within a reasonable time. Hence it necessarily 
follows that the right to have the cross-demands compensate 
each other is lost. 
By reason of the result reached herein it is unnecessary 
to consider the contentions with reference to laches. 
[6] Defendant contends that the court erred in failing to 
make a finding on its plea of the statute of limitation. How-
ever, it is a mere matter of law and mathematical computa-
tion, for whether we assume the two-year period applies, as 
for money had and received (Code Civ. Proc., § 339[1] ), or 
the four-year period, as for an action for breach of contract 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 337[1] ), it is admitted that on August 
24 and December 21, 1948, the federal government refunded 
the taxes. The action was commenced on June 8, 1949, less 
than one year thereafter and the balance of the purchase 
price was not to be paid to plaintiffs until the refund was 
obtained and hence the action did not accrue at least until 
then. 
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[7] Finally, it is asserted by defendants that a recovery 
could not be had for money had and received because the tax 
refund was received by Hercules, which was removed as a 
party to the action, rather than defendant. Without going into 
the question of whether the action was for money had and re-
ceived or on the contracts, it is clear that the tax refund re-
ceived by Hercules was for the use and benefit of plaintiffs 
under the agreements which provided that if the refund was 
received by Hercules, defendant would cause Hercules to as-
sign it to plaintiffs since all the stock and assets of Hercules 
had been delivered to defendant at that time pursuant to the 
agreements. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, .J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
[S. F. No. 18702. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1952.] 
GREGORY S. STOUT et al., Petitioners, v. DEMOCRATIC 
COUNTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE et al., Respond-
ents; FITZGERALD AMES et al., Real Parties in In-
terest. 
[1] Mandamus-Title to Office.-Generally, title to public office 
cannot be tried in a mandamus proceeding for the reason 
that quo warranto is an adequate remedy. 
[2] !d.-Existence of Office.-It is proper in mandamus to de-
termine whether the office claimed by a person legally exists. 
[3] !d.-Title to Office.-Title to office may be incidentally de-
termined in mandamus, and discretion rests with the court 
to determine whether the title should be so determined. 
[4] Quo Warranto-Trying Title to Office.-Generally, quo war-
ranto is appropriate only where there is involved a public 
office in the sense that the incumbent exercises some of the 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 22; Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 225. 
[4] See Cal.Jur., Quo Warranto, § 5; Am.Jur., Quo Warranto, 
§ 22. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 6] Mandamus, § 18; [ 4, 5] Quo 
Warranto, § 5; [7] Elections, § 34. 
